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Abstract 
In the early 2000s, the term ‘two-sided network’ has been coined to describe a form of 
organizing economic activities related to novel uses of information technology. While it 
is evident that two-sided networks make use of the novel possibilities of information 
technologies to organize economic activities, they have not yet been studied from an 
institutional perspective to shed light on the nature of this phenomenon. We suggest a 
way to remedy this situation by developing a novel classification scheme to 
systematically describe institutionally distinct forms of two-sided networks. We find that 
the phenomenon of two-sided networks may herald an entirely new way of organizing 
economic activities, possibly replacing, or evolving from, traditional forms. Moreover, 
within certain limits, there may be substitutive relationships between forms of two-sided 
networks which suggests that there are alternatives to forms which currently dominate 
the public and academic attention and which may be more desirable. 
Keywords:  Two-sided networks, transaction cost economics, institutional theory 
Introduction 
With the penetration of the Internet new forms of economic organization have evolved that do not easily fit 
into traditional categories such as firms and markets. For example, online platforms such as Amazon, 
Taobao, and Uber can be viewed as firms whose product is the organization of a market. From a neoclassical 
economic perspective, such platforms are conceptualized as ‘two-sided markets’ (Rochet and Tirole, 2006) 
or ‘two-sided networks’ (Parker and Alstyne, 2005). While this literature has created important theoretical 
insights and practical advice for entrepreneurs, there is a curious absence of efforts to conceptualize the 
phenomenon from an institutional perspective. The phenomenon has implications in several fields such as 
economics and organization studies; it is also clearly relevant for the IS field. However, to better address 
IS-relevant questions, such as what role IT plays in enabling and shaping two-sided networks, one needs to 
explain the phenomenon rather than just define it. Institutional approaches, specifically Williamson’s 
Transaction Cost Economics, have proved to be very useful for understanding IT-relevant aspects of 
organizations, e.g. with regard to such topics as IT-outsourcing and IT effects on the boundary of firms 
(Aubert et al., 2004; Malone et al., 1987). We therefore in this paper ask: How to conceptualize the 
phenomenon of two-sided networks from an institutional perspective? 
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Williamson has adapted older institutional thinking, including that of John R. Commons, to a specific 
problem, namely the ‘make or buy decision’ (Williamson, 1975 and 1987). However, the scope of his analysis 
is limited to institutional forms that can be mapped onto a continuum with markets and hierarchies at its 
end points (Hodgson, 2002). Online trading platforms cannot be mapped onto this continuum since this 
continuum implies that, as one moves towards the market pole one also moves away from the hierarchy 
pole. However, online trading platforms seem to have strong elements of both markets and hierarchies. We 
therefore propose to draw on Commons’ original ideas, especially on his distinction between three types of 
transactions called bargaining, rationing, and managerial transactions (Commons, 1931 and 1990), which 
Williamson neglected in his analysis, to bring the phenomenon of IT-enabled two-sided networks within 
the conceptual reach of an institutional approach. 
Our aim is to stimulate and encourage a novel perspective on the phenomenon of two-sided networks which, 
so far, has been studied primarily through a neo-classical lens. The ‘platformization’ of one industry after 
another (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) seems 
to indicate that new forms of organizing economic activities are announcing themselves that raise important 
practical and theoretical challenges. The largely instrumental approach inherent in the neo-classical 
treatment of two-sided networks is not adequate to make visible the full breadth and depth of this 
phenomenon. By juxtaposing a neo-classical and an institutional perspective, perspectives that otherwise 
rarely get into contact with one another except as mutually exclusive approaches to economic phenomena, 
we contribute to the literature by offering a novel, theory-based approach to explore the boundaries of this 
phenomenon and to shine a light on possibly promising and urgent questions that so far have largely 
remained in the dark. 
From an IS perspective, probably one of the most urgent questions in this regard is what role IT plays in 
the emergence of the new phenomenon that is currently being referred to as two-sided networks. While the 
transformative power of IT in general and of the Internet in particular is often mentioned, few efforts have 
been made to get close to the phenomenon in order to understand exactly how IT is transforming the 
organization of economic activities and what new forms of economic organization are thus enabled. Alfred 
Chandler (1980) has convincingly argued that, in the 19th century, novel technologies – the railroad and the 
telegraph – have played a decisive role in the transformation of first the North American and later the global 
economy in that they made possible and called for a new form of economic organization, the giant, vertically 
integrated industrial firm, which pushed aside the long dominant forms of merchant-run markets and 
family-owned businesses. Are we currently in the midst of a transformation of similar magnitude and 
thrust? Which institutional form, or rather forms, are currently shaping up? Will they replace currently 
dominant forms such as ‘markets and hierarchies’? And what exactly and concretely is the role of IT in this 
possible transformation? While answering these questions is certainly beyond the possibilities of a single 
paper and a single research team, in this paper we intend to prepare the ground for addressing such 
questions by extending the conceptual apparatus of institutional theory to capture the phenomenon of two-
sided networks and make it thus amenable to a comparative institutional analysis in view of the affordances 
of information technologies. 
We begin by examining the relevant literature on two-sided networks to demonstrate that, indeed, this 
phenomenon has not yet been evaluated from an institutional perspective. We then introduce our 
theoretical framework which extends a set of simple but powerful conceptual tools introduced by Commons 
that, however, were left largely unused by his successors and show how this framework can be used to 
systematically classify forms of economic organization described by modern institutional approaches. 
Having secured our claim that our extended classification scheme successfully copes with current 
institutional forms of economic organization we then apply this framework to the phenomenon of IT-
enabled two-sided networks to explore the boundaries of this phenomenon and to identify the novel 
theoretical and practical challenges that it implies. 
The Focus of the Literature on Two-sided Networks 
Originating in the early literature on network effects in the context of information technology 
standardization (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985), the concept of two-sided markets 
(Rochet and Tirole, 2006) or two-sided networks (Parker and Alystine, 2005) can be traced to pioneering 
works by Rochet and Tirole (2001) and Parker and Alystine (2000). Their intuition was that, for the case of 
so-called indirect network effects, there must be two or more ‘user groups’ which provide each other with 
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network benefits. For example, users of software to create PDF documents depend upon users who use 
software that can read PDF documents. The more users there are that own software capable of reading PDF 
documents, the more worthwhile it becomes to own software that can create PDF documents and vice versa. 
In addition, often a third party is involved that brings these two user groups together, in this case this was, 
of course, the company Adobe which developed the PDF format and was an early producer of both types of 
software, PDF writing and PDF reading products. Accordingly, two-sided markets (or networks) are defined 
as consisting of two user groups that provide each other with network benefits and which are brought into 
contact with each other through a platform (Galaugher and Wang, 2002). 
The early Adobe example also illustrates the main topic that the literature has explored subsequently, 
namely the question whether, and if so how, the platform provider should charge differential access and 
usage fees to participating user groups. As is commonly known, Adobe chose to provide its PDF reading 
software for free while charging relatively high prices for its PDF writing software, a choice which turned 
out to be very effective for Adobe. In their foundational paper, Rochet and Tirole (2001) have already 
mentioned a number of further applications of the basic idea such as operating systems as platforms (with 
application software users and developers as user groups), computer games (ditto), telecommunication 
services, and media streaming networks. Early formal applications referred to credit card systems as 
platforms (Rochet and Tirole, 2002) and web server and web client (browser) software (equivalent to the 
Adobe case) (Galaugher and Wang, 2002). 
The topic of platform access and usage pricing became so dominant in the literature that Rochet and Tirole 
(2006) have proposed to adopt a narrower technical definition of the concept of two-sided markets. 
Specifically, they suggest that only those markets should count as two-sided markets in which the choice of 
the platform provider regarding charging differential access and usage prices to the involved user groups 
affects economic outputs such as transaction volumes. If such choices do not affect economic outcome 
variables, for example because user groups can reverse such choices through bilateral negotiation, then a 
“one-sided” market exists and it would be a “waste of time” for public and private decision makers to 
concern themselves with matters of platform access and usage pricing (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 648). 
In their “progress report” on the literature on two-sided markets, Rochet and Tirole (2006) also come 
closest to addressing issues relevant to institutional economists when they discuss the question whether 
traditional firms can also be viewed as instances of two-sided markets, thus potentially collapsing the 
distinction between hierarchical firms and markets. However, they conclude that such an application, while 
possible in principle, is unlikely to provide an accurate description of firms since, at least in competitive 
labor and product markets, they have little “wriggle room” to adjust access and use fees (wages and product 
prices) to and of the firm viewed as a platform. Yet, far from moving towards studying institutional aspects 
of two-sided markets, this idea rather shows that the concept is increasingly being turned into a 
methodological tool through which a variety of phenomena can be viewed and analyzed. Guo et al., (2010) 
therefore conclude that “... [a]lmost all economic analyses [of two-sided markets] assume that price is the 
dominant factor that determines all platform users’ rational choices ...” (p. 4). We therefore want to retrieve 
an understanding of two-sided markets as an economic phenomenon (rather than as an analytical tool) by 
applying an institutional lens to bring forth hidden and possibly interesting and relevant aspects which have 
not yet been discussed – nor observed – in the literature.   
Theoretical Framework: Extending Commons’ Distinction Between 
Types of Transactions 
In this section, we present a novel analytical framework to classify institutional forms of organizing 
economic activities which builds on and extends an analytical distinction introduced by John R. Commons. 
In the subsequent section we will then demonstrate how the institutional forms described by Williamson 
can be mapped onto our classification scheme. This mapping will also show that the phenomenon of two-
sided markets constitutes an institutionally distinct form not considered by Williamson. This then prepares 
the ground for using our classification framework to characterize institutionally distinct forms of two-sided 
networks. 
Commons builds his monumental but also hard to penetrate “Institutional Economics” on the hypothesis 
that classical and neo-classical economics have largely failed to account for the institutional nature of 
economic relationships. Specifically, classical economists have conceptualized economic relationships as 
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relations between man and nature which appears either in the form of physical productive resources or in 
the form of physical consumable commodities. His main claim is that, while these relationships are 
obviously important, they are controlled by various forms of collective action, subsumed under the concepts 
of going concerns and custom, which limit and, at the same time, liberate and extend individual action. An 
institution, therefore, is defined “... as collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual 
action” (Commons, 1931, p. 648). Going concerns are purposefully organized forms of collective action 
while custom refers to emergent forms of collective action.1 
Institutions thus refer to economic relations among actors. Such relations are characterized simultaneously 
by conflict of interest, interdependence, and order. Conflict of interest refers to the “principle of scarcity” 
in the sense that actors compete for scarce resources (wealth); interdependence refers to the “principle of 
efficiency” in that actors depend on each other for the creation of resources (wealth); and order refers to 
the “principle of futurity” in that actors engage in relationships with other actors in the expectation of 
orderly conduct of transactions in the future. Institutions thus concern relationships between humans 
characterized simultaneously by scarcity, interdependence, and order. There are many other forms of 
human relationships, of course, so that any analysis derived from Commons’ definition of institutions must 
be limited to relationships involving the three named principles. For example, Internet forums, where 
people meet to discuss issues of shared concern, may be characterized by interdependence – people depend 
on each other for meaningful contribution – and order – people participate in the anticipation of continued 
and fruitful future exchange – but there is no scarcity of resources that would have to be somehow ‘shared’ 
among members. Thus, Internet forums fall outside the scope of Commons’ analysis unless they also 
address problems of sharing scarce resources. Our analysis, therefore, cannot capture all organizational 
phenomena emerging from the Internet. However, in our elaboration of the classification scheme we will 
indicate that such broader phenomena, including Internet forums, may form a substrate on which new 
forms of economic organization can grow, ones that are contained within the scope of our analysis. 
Since Commons’ point of departure is the relationship between human actors, defined through and limited 
by the three principles of scarcity, efficiency, and futurity, his basic unit of analysis concerns the relationship 
between humans, not individual actions directed towards non-human objects such as exploitable 
productive resources and pleasure-giving commodities. Specifically, he defines as his basic unit of analysis 
a transaction which involves at least two human actors and distinguishes between three types of 
transactions, namely bargaining, rationing, and managerial transactions. A bargaining transaction 
describes the relationships between at least two prospective buyers and sellers respectively, who are all legal 
equals. A rationing transaction describes the relationship between a collective body as the superior and its 
members as inferiors where the collective body apportions benefits and burdens among its members. 
Finally, a managerial transaction describes the relationship between a superior, the manager, and her 
subordinates. The purpose of a managerial transaction is the creation of wealth whereas the purpose of a 
bargaining transaction is its distribution. Commons is less clear about the purpose of a rationing transaction 
but we argue that, properly interpreted in the context of his overall approach, it also refers to the problem 
of distributing wealth.2 Typical examples for each type of transaction are: a two-sided auction on a stock 
                                                             
1 In this paper, we draw mostly on Commons’ book “Institutional Economics” (1990, first published in 1934) 
but occasionally also refer to an earlier short article by Commons (1931) which outlines his main ideas. 
While the short article is a useful guide to and summary of chapter II of the book, which sets out his main 
ideas and concepts, an intensive reading of chapter II of the book is still necessary to reveal their internal 
connections and true meaning. As shown in the introduction by Malcolm Rutherford to the reissue of 
Commons’ book (1990) as well as by more recent efforts by Kaufman (2003 and 2007) to introduce the 
partly opaque work of Commons to a contemporary audience, there are a number of inconsistencies in 
Commons’ use of some of his concepts which makes reliance on a summarized version problematic. Unless 
otherwise indicated, we therefore refer to Commons’ book in our presentation of his main ideas. 
2 “Rationing transactions apportion the burdens and benefits of wealth creation by the dictation of legal 
superiors.” (Commons, 1990, p. 68). However, on the one hand Commons explicitly states, shortly before 
defining it, that a rationing transaction refers to the “rationing of wealth or purchasing power” (ibid.); on 
the other hand, one of his main examples for rationing transactions, taxation policy, does not necessarily 
imply a relation with wealth creation whereas other examples, such as allocation of financial resources in a 
corporation, are related to wealth creation. Moreover, he later concludes that “... there may be all degrees 
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exchange (bargaining transaction), the allocation of a budget in a multi-divisional firm (rationing 
transaction), and production planning (managerial transaction). 
Implied in this distinction between the three types of transactions is thus a further distinction between two 
purposes of transactions, the creation of wealth on the one hand and its distribution or sharing on the other 
hand. While Commons does not make this explicit – probably because this is obvious to the careful reader 
and thus does not need to be specifically pointed out – these two purposes are directly related to two of the 
three principles that he uses to define an institution, namely the principle of efficiency, which concerns the 
creation of wealth, and the principle of scarcity, which concerns the distribution or sharing of wealth. For 
our analysis it is doubly useful to highlight this connection. On the one hand, in what follows we will limit 
our analysis to phenomena which can be described by Commons’ notion of transactions – which we will 
extend by a fourth type – and thus must leave open the question how the principle of futurity, which is not 
worked into Commons’ notion of transaction, is involved in the emergence of new forms of economic 
organization. We will briefly address this issue in our ‘limitations’ section. Secondly, the distinction between 
the two purposes of transactions and, along with this distinction, that between the principles of scarcity and 
efficiency will turn out to be quite useful for extending Williamson’s analytical framework. 
While Williamson has not explicitly mapped his markets-hierarchy continuum onto Commons’ three forms 
of transactions, it is illustrative to attempt to do so. A straightforward mapping might be: hierarchy: 
managerial transaction; market: bargaining transaction; and hybrid (which combines elements of 
hierarchies and markets): rationing transaction. However, such a mapping would ignore the distinction 
between the purpose of creating wealth vs. its distribution which is implied in Commons’ definition of the 
three types of transactions, as we have just pointed out. Moreover, it would also negate the possibility that 
specific institutional forms of organizing economic activities, which Commons would refer to as forms of 
going concerns, may combine various types of transactions, a possibility explicitly mentioned by Commons 
(1990, p. 93, see Footnote 2). 
The question thus arises how else the classification systems of Williamson and Commons can be combined. 
Being able to show that such a combination is feasible would add to the conceptual consistency of 
institutional approaches and might reveal phenomena which have, so far, been overlooked by modern 
institutional theorists, including those that interest IS researchers. To arrive at such an integrated 
classification system, we first inspect Commons’ three types of transactions for completeness. 
Williamson encountered a problem with his original two-way classification of firms vs. markets 
(Williamson, 1975) when considering long-term supply relationships between firms because these could 
neither be classified as pure hierarchies nor as pure markets. He resolved this problem by allowing for a 
hybrid form which combines both elements of markets and firms (Williamson, 1987 and 2002). On first 
glance, it appears that Commons’ would classify such instances, i.e. hybrids, as forms of rationing 
transactions, as indicated above. However, rationing transactions refer to the problem of distributing 
wealth or, in modern language, of sharing resources, whereas long-term supply relationships between firms 
concern the problem of how to efficiently combine productive resources of suppliers and customers to 
create wealth (value) (Williamson, 2002). By contrast, Commons lacks a concept to describe such relations 
while his notion of a rationing transaction can, indeed, be used to describe the long-term relations between 
firms with regard to the problem of sharing resources. For example, an instance of a rationing transaction 
can be seen in the case of trade associations. Trade associations often impose certain behaviors on their 
members which is an instance of allocating benefits and burdens through rationing (Commons, 1990). 
We therefore extend Commons’ framework by formally introducing a fourth type of transaction which we 
call a mutual adjustment transaction. This is defined as describing the relationship between two or more 
legal equals and as addressing the problem of combining resources for the purpose of wealth (value) 
creation.3 In a mutual adjustment transaction, the several parties continually observe each other’s actions 
                                                             
of combinations, for the three kinds of transactions are interdependent and variable in a world of collective 
action and perpetual change ...” (p. 93). (Below, we will expand the idea that various types of transactions 
are usually combined in particular forms of collective action.) Here, we conclude that rationing transactions 
primarily refer to the purpose of distributing wealth, whether for productive or for consumptive purposes. 
3 The name for this type of transaction is borrowed from organization theory which distinguishes between 
various types of coordination mechanisms, including ‘mutual adjustment’ (Mintzberg, 1979). Our definition 
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and, if necessary, adjust their actions to ensure that their actions, or rather their actions’ output, fit together 
in a productive manner. The difference with a managerial transaction consists of the nature of the involved 
parties. In a managerial transaction, they are a superior and a subordinate, in a mutual adjustment 
transaction, they are legal equals. It thus turns out that extending Commons’ framework is quite 
straightforward since we can easily define this new form of transaction in terms of his own definitional 
terminology and arrive at a type of transaction that accurately characterizes important aspects of long-term 
supply relationships between firms as described by Williamson through his concept of a hybrid. This also 
shows that a one-on-one mapping of Williamson’s institutional forms onto Commons’ types of transactions 
is no longer feasible – since the now four types of transactions would have to be mapped onto Williamson’s 
three institutional forms – and may have been misguided in the first place. 
This becomes clear when one recognizes that an institutional form of organizing economic activities (‘going 
concerns’ in Commons’ and ‘governance structures’ in Williamson’s terminology) may combine two or more 
types of transactions, a possibility explicitly indicated by Commons, as we have observed above. Moreover, 
it is reasonable to assume that institutional forms always address both types of problems, namely that of 
sharing resources and that of combining them for value creation. We therefore propose a two-dimensional 
rather than a one-dimensional classification system which takes these two fundamental problems of 
organizing economic activities, and, along with this distinction, the distinction between the two principles 
of scarcity and efficiency as its dimensions. According to the extended list of types of transactions, there are 
then two types of transactions available for addressing each problem, as shown in Figure 1.4 
 
Figure 1: Extended scheme for classifying institutional forms 
 
                                                             
of a ‘mutual adjustment transaction’ is consistent with the use of the term ‘mutual adjustment’ in 
organization theory, namely as referring to coordination actions among equals who need to ensure that 
their several activities fit together. However, in organization theory the term is usually used in a context of 
intra-organizational coordination whereas we want to use the term in a more general sense. This is indicated 
by our addition of the term ‘transaction’ which, in Commons’ system who considers the ‘transaction’ to be 
the basic unit of analysis, allows for intra- as well as for inter-organizational application. 
4 Kaufman (2003 and 2007) has more recently offered a new reading of Commons in an attempt to make 
known Commons to a wider audience and also to demonstrate a way in which Commons’ analysis can be 
readily applied to contemporary phenomena. However, while he offers a rich description of various other 
concepts proposed by Commons, he gives only fleeting reference to Commons’ distinction between the three 
types of transactions. Moreover, he tends to collapse them into yet another dichotomy (or continuum) 
characterized by centralized vs. decentralized decision making. 
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Mapping Williamson’s Institutional Forms onto the Extended 
Classification Scheme 
Above, we have argued that it would strengthen institutional approaches if the classification systems of 
Williamson and Commons could be combined to produce a consistent and comprehensive system. While a 
direct mapping of Williamson’s institutional forms onto Commons’ three types of transactions was only 
possible if one ignored Commons’ distinction between the problems of distributing and creating wealth 
(sharing and combing resources), mapping Williamson’s institutional forms onto the extended 
classification scheme avoids this problem. Figure 2 shows the result of our mapping. 
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Figure 2: Mapping Williamson’s institutional forms onto the  
extended classification scheme 
 
We will justify our classification of Williamson’s institutional forms by briefly showing how each of 
Williamson’s three forms (market, hybrid, hierarchy) can be seen as an instance of a particular pair of types 
of transactions as indicated in Figure 2. This also demonstrates how Commons’ idea of combining types of 
transactions into distinct and variable forms of collective action can be exemplified. Our analysis reveals 
that one possible form is not described by Williamson and we will show that a traditional form of two-sided 
markets, managed markets or exchanges, can be seen as an instance of this theoretical possibility. 
Williamson’s Hierarchy 
Williamson responded to critics who claimed that there is no principal difference between markets and 
firms by arguing that firms are fundamentally distinct from markets because courts generally reject to 
accept cases concerning internal conflicts about resource allocation, thus establishing management as a 
quasi-legal body in matters of internal resource allocation. This, he argues, creates a type of internal 
authority which, in markets, would be associated with courts but cannot be performed by the market 
participants themselves (Williamson, 1987 and 2002).5 
Considering this argument in view of Commons’ distinction between types of transactions, the internal 
authority, which characterizes firms as opposed to markets, can be seen to perform two types of transactions 
regarding its internal relationships, namely rationing and managerial transactions. 
Managerial transactions in firms are all managerial decisions that concern the combination of resources or 
assets according to the principle of efficiency, e.g. production planning and scheduling (combining 
                                                             
5 Hodgson uses the same argument to justify the principal difference between hierarchies and markets and 
then goes on to criticize Williamson for not taking seriously this (Williamson’s own) argument when 
introducing hybrids as an intermediate form (Hodgson, 2002). 
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materials and machine and worker capacities) and marketing (combining various design, communication, 
and research resources, among others, to produce a consistent marketing campaign). 
Rationing transactions are all managerial decisions that concern the allocation of scarce resources among 
competing organizational activities, e.g. budget planning (allocating the firm’s financial resources among 
divisions or functional departments) and promotion decisions (allocating positions to employees); the 
former are explicitly mentioned by Commons as instances of rationing transactions. 
Market before the Fundamental Transformation: Clusters 
Williamson distinguishes between two types of market relationships, namely whether at least one of the 
involved parties has made partner-specific investments (creating so-called asset specificity) or not; such 
investments cause a “fundamental transformation” of the market relationship (Williamson, 1987 and 
2002).6 
The market relationship before the fundamental transformation is characterized by the freedom of all 
involved parties to costlessly sever the relationship with a business partner. This allows for treating each 
transaction as independent from earlier or later transactions. A possibly negative impact of tough price 
negotiations on long-term relationships thus does not need to be considered. 
While many forms of markets fit this description, a specific form turns out to be very interesting in view of 
our classification system, namely so-called clusters as described by Porter (1990 and 1998). While firms in 
such clusters have typically developed trust-based relationships as a result of recurring and ongoing 
transactions, they are not tied to one another through relationship-specific investments. Rather, firms are 
free to choose their business partner for each transaction anew, depending on availability of production 
capacity and specialization as well as on price. This freedom of choice is established through a high degree 
of specialization in the presence of intense competition within each group of specialized suppliers. Any firm 
in the cluster can therefore tap into a pool of highly specialized as well as extremely competitive suppliers 
and choose the supplier that offers the best deal on each occasion, i.e. to engage in bargaining transactions. 
Clusters evolve over long periods of time to create such conditions. One crucial aspect is that firms chose 
their business focus in view of the choices made by all other firms in the cluster. In this sense, firms adjust 
their production capacities and focus to one another as the cluster continues to evolve. As pointed out by 
Porter (1990), a crucial aspect of the competitiveness of a cluster as a whole consists of the willingness of 
its member firms to continually update their production equipment. Each such updating decision can 
therefore be conceptualized as a mutual adjustment transaction because such investments are only viable 
in the context of the cluster as a whole but do not establish a dependence relation to any particular firm 
within the cluster. 
Market after the Fundamental Transformation: Hybrids 
Once partner-specific investments have been made, adjustments to changing market conditions can no 
longer be made costlessly by switching transaction parties or terminating contracts because this will 
significantly reduce the value of partner-specific investments. Since the involved parties will anticipate such 
problems, they will attempt to take precautionary measures, such as entering liquidated damages clauses 
into contracts or agreeing on arbitration mechanisms in cases of conflict. All such measures are also costly 
in terms of transaction costs. 
Williamson refers to such precautionary measures as private ordering, i.e. the setting up of specific 
governance structures tailored to the transaction problem at hand, which gives rise to an intermediate form 
of economic organization between market and firm called “hybrid” (Williamson, 1987 and 2002). In view 
of Commons’ distinction between types of transactions, a hybrid can be conceptualized as a collective body, 
composed of the transaction parties, which, in case of conflict, apportions benefits and costs of resolving 
                                                             
6 There is no inherent trend or necessity for a market to experience a fundamental transformation. Many 
markets, including our example of clusters to be described below, persist in a state which is characterized 
by the absence of partner-specific investments; indeed, some markets, including clusters, thrive on the 
ability of members to costlessly change transaction parties. 
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the conflict through a rationing transaction. Williamson, in his analysis of cases involving partner-specific 
investments, focuses on cases where parties to a business relationship characterized by partner-specific 
investments need to make quantity adjustments to changing market conditions ex post, i.e. after having 
already fixed supply quantities in purchasing contracts. Without the prior setting up of dedicated decision 
making bodies, one party may opportunistically exploit the dependence of the other party created through 
the partner-specific investment, e.g. by asking for higher (lower) prices than originally agreed in response 
to changing market conditions. Importantly, because parties anticipate the possibility of such opportunistic 
behavior, they will shy away from making partner-specific investments in the absence of protective 
governance structures even when such investments are relatively more efficient. Partner-specific 
investments, in turn, can be conceptualized as instances of a mutual adjustment transaction since the 
business parties adjust their production capacities and capabilities to one another according to the principle 
of efficiency. 
Managed Market: Exchanges 
The institutionalized combination of bargaining and managerial transactions has not been considered by 
Williamson, probably because bargaining transactions are generally associated with market coordination 
and managerial transactions with hierarchical coordination, two forms of organizing economic activities 
usually considered to be mutually exclusive. 
However, stock or commodity exchanges are an obvious example of a managed market that supports 
bargaining transactions. To enable such auction-type price negotiation, exchanges need to operate a 
complex apparatus comprising organizational as well as technical elements. Market participants have to 
perform specific roles and a complex socio-technical machinery has to be orchestrated and maintained that 
facilitates the swift publication of prices or price quotes and, most importantly, the execution of contracts 
(Mulherin et al., 1991). All this requires the skillful and efficient combination of resources. On many 
organized markets, such decisions are made by a management hierarchy, i.e. through managerial 
transactions. 
Other Proposals to Extend Williamson’s Classification System 
Other ways of extending Williamson’s distinction between markets, hierarchies, and hybrids have been 
proposed in the literature. From a sociological or managerial perspective, a number of proposals have been 
made which share the same basic argument, namely that relationships among economic actors are not only 
based on a narrow economic or legal rationale but also on social mechanisms that recognize the social 
nature of human beings. These include Ouchi’s (1980) concept of clans, Granovetter’s (1994) concept of 
business groups, Ciborra’s (1996) ‘teams and markets approach’, and various proposals which are 
collectively addressed as the ‘Swedish Network Approach’ (Johanson and Mattson, 1987). These proposals 
tend to juxtapose economic and social aspects of economic relationships. They can be characterized as 
efforts to offer a richer and more precise description of contemporary phenomena but lack the analytical 
capabilities of institutional approaches that link certain economic problems with particular institutional 
arrangements. 
From a legal perspective, Hodgson argues that Williamson’s distinction between markets, hybrids, and 
hierarchies fails to take into account that there is a fundamental difference between “proper” or “pure” 
markets and long-term relationships between firms. He even argues that the latter do not involve market 
transactions at all and proposes to call such arrangements “relational exchanges” or “non-market 
exchanges” because their purpose is not the one-time exchange of a product or service, as in “proper” 
markets, but the maintenance of a business relationship (Hodgson, 2002). However, while his distinction 
between short-term relationships and relational exchange is clearly important and descriptively accurate, 
he also does not offer an analytical apparatus for linking forms of economic organization with fundamental 
problems of allocating resources. Instead, his categories are purely descriptive, like those of the above 
mentioned managerial and sociological approaches, albeit from a legal or institutional perspective. 
We therefore propose that our rendering and extension of Commons’ framework is novel and possibly 
fruitful for the analysis of IT-enabled phenomena, including two-sided networks, as it yields four distinct 
forms of economic organization characterized by the combination of two types of transactions which 
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address both fundamental problems of economic organization distinguished by Commons in institutionally 
distinct ways. 
Mapping Two-sided Networks onto the Framework 
After having demonstrated how ‘traditional’ forms of organizing economic activities, including hierarchical 
firms, clusters, hybrids, and exchanges, can be systematically classified by our extended scheme we will now 
show how the novel phenomenon of IT-enabled two-sided networks can be analyzed into distinct 
institutional forms by relating this phenomenon to the four generic forms identified by our framework. This 
mapping will also reveal that the concept of two-sided networks comprises phenomena that have not yet 
been related to one another in a systematic fashion. Figure 3 displays the result of our mapping which we 
will now describe and justify in detail. 
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Figure 3: Forms of two-sided networks, seen from an institutional perspective 
 
Online Trading Platforms 
Online trading platforms, such as eBay or Taobao, combine managerial transactions and bargaining 
transactions. They are just the online version of traditional organized exchanges and thus our analysis 
regarding managed markets applies to online trading platforms without modification. Indeed, as traditional 
exchanges continue to automate their operations, they come to resemble their online-only siblings more 
and more. For example, so-called floor-trading on traditional exchanges is increasingly replaced by online 
trading, albeit on dedicated networks rather than over the public Internet (Heng, 2003). 
Online Service Delivery Platforms 
Online service delivery platforms, such as Uber, combine managerial transactions and rationing 
transactions, similar to Williamson’s hierarchy. In contrast to hierarchically organized firms, rationing and 
managerial transactions are made with regard to platform members, not employees. For example, Uber 
uses algorithms to decide which vehicle is being sent to which client, based on various factors such as 
current location of vehicles, traffic situation, and caller preferences. That means Uber uses managerial 
transactions to combine resources, in this case driver, vehicle, and client, to create a useful service, similar 
to production planning and control processes. In addition, Uber prescribes requirements for drivers, cars, 
and clients, and also sets prices, thus apportioning benefits and costs among its members, i.e. it also 
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conducts rationing transactions. For example, in 2014 Uber has lowered prices in Germany, responding to 
ongoing legal disputes with local taxi services, thus shifting benefits from drivers to clients.7 
Indeed, the ongoing legal disputes between Uber and local taxi services show that taxi services traditionally 
operate (local) platforms for creating transportation services. These use different legal forms such as limited 
company and cooperative to operate their services and also employ IT-based platforms to combine vehicles, 
drivers, and clients into useful services. The main difference between these traditional taxi services and 
Uber consists in the global reach of the latter. One may therefore conceive of Uber as a globally standardized 
platform whereas traditional taxi services rarely reach beyond local boundaries such as a city. 
Industry-wide Information Infrastructures 
A further phenomenon, which now reveals itself as an instance of a two-sided network, regards industry-
wide information infrastructures (III). Rooted in modest beginnings where companies began to connect 
their internal information systems to create so-called inter-organizational information systems (IOIS) 
(Cash, 1985), III increasingly facilitate cooperation across whole industries. Specifically, III involve mutual 
adjustment as well as rationing transactions. For example, supply chain members use III to engage in joint 
production planning processes (Johnston and Lee, 1997; VICS, 2010). As members of a supply chain cannot 
refer to a super-ordinate authority to coordinate their activities, they need to mutually adjust their 
production plans so as to optimize the material flow across the whole supply chain subject to various 
constraints. Regarding service industries, pharmaceutical distribution and dispensing offers an interesting 
example. Here, various actors such as physicians, pharmacists, hospitals, home care organizations etc. have 
to coordinate their several actions in order to offer a safe and effective medication therapy and also to adjust 
the initially determined medication therapy to the evolving condition of the patient (Kohn et al., 2000). 
III also involve rationing transactions as industry members have to comply with certain procedures and 
interfacing requirements for the III to function. Such specifications are usually produced by industry 
standardization bodies, often specifically set up for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the III. For 
example, in the German pharmaceutical distribution industry the trade associations of manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and pharmacies have jointly set up an organization that administers a product code used to 
identify drugs which is an essential component of the industry’s information infrastructure (Wagner, 2005). 
This body defines responsibilities and rights regarding the maintenance of the product code, e.g. who has 
to apply for the code, what information must be supplied, and who has the right to access the joint database 
containing the code as well as additional information, thus apportioning benefits and burdens among 
industry members. 
Virtual Clusters 
Social networks are one of the most interesting novel IT-enabled phenomena. However, they have rarely 
been related to problems of organizing economic activities, except in the context of facilitating 
communication and cooperation in traditional firms (Riemer and Johnston, 2012). However, we believe 
that social networks can also become the basis for a new form of economic organization which might be 
characterized as a virtual cluster. Similar to geographical clusters described above, virtual clusters combine 
mutual adjustment and bargaining transactions. Prototypes of such forms may be seen in simple forums 
where participants gather around some focal themes and may occasionally offer used items related to their 
common interest for sale. Not every type of item may be considered to be appropriate for such offerings and 
the understanding of what constitutes a suitable item for trading on a particular thematic social platform 
may evolve over time. Eventually, a ‘self-regulated’ marketplace may emerge where participants can tap 
into a large pool of specialized and highly competitive product or service offerings as is characteristic of a 
cluster. The equivalent of geographical proximity and its associated close personal ties can be seen in the 
shared interest and its associated trust-based relationships that may evolve on thematic social platforms. 
Especially in emerging thematic fields such as novel forms of sports or gaming activities an ‘ecosystem’ of 
complementary services and products may arise in this manner. Participants who originally shared an equal 
interest in their hobby gradually take over specific roles such as provider and consumer. As with 
                                                             
7 Entry on Uber on the German Wikipedia site, last updated on April 26 2016, retrieved on May 8, 2016. 
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geographical clusters, providers’ specializations co-evolve to eventually form a complementary, competitive 
and highly specialized pool of resources, resulting from ongoing mutual adjustment transactions. Tapping 
into this pool is then done through bargaining transactions that are regulated by emergent norms of 
behavior (“custom” in Commons’ terminology) rather than through a central oversight body. 
Discussion 
In this section we will first discuss whether our examples in fact qualify as instances of two-sided networks. 
We will then turn to discussing theoretical and practical implications of our analysis. These concern three 
issues: (1) How do two-sided networks, as possibly novel forms of organizing economic activities, relate to 
currently dominant forms? (2) Are there substitutive relationships between forms of two-sided networks as 
there are between traditional forms of organizing economic activities such as between markets and 
hierarchies? (3) In view of all eight institutional forms of organizing economic activities identified through 
our classification scheme, can we derive more fundamental questions and hypotheses about how 
institutional forms combine types of transactions? 
First, however, we must clarify whether all four forms classified above are, indeed, two-sided networks. As 
shown above, a two-sided network is defined as an arrangement where an intermediary brings together two 
distinct user groups who provide each other with network benefits. Well-known examples are credit card 
networks (card holders and retailers), computer operating systems (users and developers), recruitment 
sites (job seekers and employers), and online markets (buyers and sellers). 
Online trading platforms and online service delivery networks are often quoted examples of two-sided 
markets. We therefore do not further discuss these two types. Industry-wide information infrastructures 
also clearly fall into the category of two-sided markets. For example, in the case of III for supply chain 
management the different user groups are supply chain members who, through complying with certain 
interfacing requirements, provide each other with network benefits related to coordinating production 
planning: The more companies comply with a particular interface specification the higher the value of 
participation in the network as a whole becomes. Standardization bodies can then be seen as the actor that 
brings together these user groups. 
Regarding virtual clusters, the involvement of an intermediary is much less visible. Market rules emerge on 
a particular platform without managerial oversight. Likewise, trading on the platform is not monitored by 
a central authority. Yet, a virtual cluster, like its geographical sibling, requires a ‘caring’ body or group of 
bodies. In the case of geographical clusters, these are often local development agencies and local banks that 
attract suitable firms to the cluster and help by running complementary systems and basic infrastructures 
such as schooling, administration, financing, and transportation (Porter, 1990). On virtual networks, such 
services comprise the running of a social network platform, possibly involving ‘virtual’ counterparts to the 
just named services such as operation of arbitration and petition mechanisms and responsiveness to 
requests for extending the functionality of the platform. The several user groups brought together by such 
actions are the specialized groups of product and service providers. The more such specialized groups are 
attracted to the cluster, and the more competitive each group is internally, the higher the value for all 
participants in the cluster. 
We therefore conclude that all four forms identified through our classification system are, indeed, instances 
of two-sided networks. 
Relationship between Extant and Emerging Forms of Economic Organizing 
A first noteworthy implication of analyzing forms of organizing economic activities based on our 
classification system is that all four forms of two-sided networks seem to have ‘predecessors’ in traditional 
forms of organizing economic activity. The clearest case concerns online trading platforms which are just 
online versions of traditional organized markets, as we have already observed. A very interesting case 
concerns online service delivery platforms which may become the modern heir to traditional hierarchical 
firms, as suggested by our classification system. Both combine managerial and rationing transactions to 
provide a service which may also comprise the design and delivery of a product. Malone and Laubacher 
(1998) have discussed this possibility in the context of their vision of the “e-lancer”, a self-employed worker 
who replaces the traditional life-long employee of hierarchical firms, and suggested that modern guilds may 
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succeed firms in maintaining performance records and credentials of the e-lancer (Laubacher and Malone, 
1997). However, another, less benign possibility is that online service delivery platforms such as Uber take 
over this role. Recently, the choice between firms (hierarchies) and two-sided networks has been modelled 
from an economic perspective (Haigu and Wright, 2015) which corroborates our claim that online service 
delivery platforms, as instances of two-sided networks, can be viewed as institutional alternatives to 
traditional firms. 
Likewise, industry-wide information infrastructures may be seen as modern successors to traditional 
supply chain management approaches based on long-term bilateral relationships among adjacent supply 
chain members, described as hybrids by Williamson. Indeed, industry-wide information infrastructures 
may enable a much more integrated approach to complex problems of supply chain management. For 
example, in a scenario-based approach Reimers and Guo (2014) describe so-called supply chain resource 
planning systems (SCRP) that replicate the logic of ERP systems at the supply chain level to identify the 
conditions under which such systems would be viable. Finally, the concept of virtual clusters is an 
extrapolation of traditional geographical clusters to the online world. Presently, only rudimentary forms 
are visible and it remains to be seen whether these forms evolve towards a viable new form of organizing 
economic activities. 
The main difference between traditional and emerging forms of organizing economic activities, as indicated 
by our analysis, is that two-sided networks can be seen as higher-order forms of organizing economic 
activities. Seen from a classical or neo-classical perspective, they involve only traditional forms such as 
markets and firms. For example, an online service delivery platform can be seen as a nexus of contracts 
between the platform operator and independent, self-employed agents. However, the legal disputes 
regarding the business practices of Uber suggest that courts increasingly see a dependence relationship 
between these agents and the platform operator. For example, in 2015, several court rulings in the US have 
upheld a decision by the California Employment Development Department against Uber to treat Uber 
drivers as employees of Uber, not as independent contractors.8 Thus, the phenomenon of Uber cannot be 
accurately described as a combination of a hierarchy – Uber as a company – and a market – the relationship 
between Uber and its driver-members. Rather, Uber must be seen as a more comprehensive organization 
which organizes different types of relationships that are hard to describe in terms of extant legal concepts.  
Likewise, industry-wide information infrastructures may create new forms of dependence among supply 
chain members that currently elude the extant legal and economic conceptual apparatus. For example, 
organizations such as RosettaNet may be interpreted as platforms that organize whole industries. The 
standards developed and maintained by this industry group go much further in terms of organizing 
productive processes than is usual for standards developing organizations (Reimers, 2001). Regarding 
online trading platforms, their offline siblings such as the London Insurance Market already comprise large 
firms as members as well as several trade associations, forming complex higher-order organizational 
structures (Barrett and Walsham, 1999). Their online versions are likely to follow suit. Likewise, 
geographical clusters are recognized as complex, higher-order forms of economic organization (Porter, 
1990; Kumar et al., 1998). The emergence of virtual clusters, as we have described them, is currently a topic 
of speculation. However, it is not unlikely that, once in place, they also organize relationships among their 
members, which may be organizations themselves, in non-standard ways. 
We therefore conclude that there is a distinct possibility that present-day two-sided networks are proto-
forms of novel, higher-order forms of organizing economic activity that may be recognized by courts in the 
near future and even may give rise to the creation of new legal forms of organizing economic activity, similar 
to the creation of the modern corporation at the end of the nineteenths century in response to the rise of 
the giant, vertically integrated industrial firm (Chandler, 1980). 
In fact, higher-order forms of economic organization are not a new phenomenon at all. For example, various 
forms of trade associations have existed for centuries and were as abundant in earlier times as they are 
nowadays. However, outside the field of political science they are rarely addressed as a relevant 
phenomenon of economic organization, with Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action being a rare 
exception. More recently, Knoke (1990) has presented a systematic albeit rather descriptive study of North 
                                                             
8 “Uber Driver Declared Employee as the Company Loses another Ruling,” The Guardian, September 11, 
2015. 
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American trade associations as forms of collective action. Organizational scholars are traditionally more 
open to the study of various forms of trade associations as relevant economic phenomena. Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (1978) study of inter-firm relations clearly stands out as preparing the ground for analyzing 
higher-order forms of economic organization. Astley and Fombrun (1983) have built on their work to 
distinguish various forms of higher-order economic organization (agglomerate, confederate, conjugate, and 
organic). Much earlier, Emery and Trist (1965) have introduced the concept of the “referent organization”, 
later elaborated by Trist (1983), to describe the phenomenon of higher-order economic organization. All 
these examples frame the phenomenon of higher-order economic organization as various forms of collective 
action, which seems to be a natural approach to such phenomena.9 
When juxtaposing this literature with the two ‘managed’ forms of our classification scheme, online trading 
and service delivery platforms, it appears that one novel aspect brought about by these types of two-sided 
networks is that ‘primary’ forms of economic organization, i.e. forms that create useful and marketable 
products and services, are increasingly reaching at a level that was traditionally analyzed as collective action 
of organizations, typically as a not-for-profit endeavor. Thus, the phenomena of online trading and service 
delivery platforms may indicate that this traditional two-level structure – profit-oriented firms at the first 
level and collective action of such firms at the second-level – is collapsing into a broader phenomenon, one 
where profit-oriented firms aim to organize economic activities in a much more comprehensive sense. The 
vast economic literature on standardization processes that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the 
wake of the foundational papers by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1985) seems to 
corroborate this analysis in the sense that standardization, traditionally viewed as a field of collective action 
where firms come together to produce standards as a ‘collective good’, has been firmly brought into the 
realm of a strictly economic analysis where ‘network externalities’, as private cost and use increments, 
explain the emergence of standards rather than forms of collective action. Incidentally, the concept of two-
sided networks grew out of this literature, as we have observed at the beginning of this paper.  
The traditional distinction between these two levels, commercial activities of firms on the one hand and 
collective action of firms on the other hand, is also reflected in the IS literature where it has concerned itself 
with large, industry-level systems, e.g. in the form of EDI networks (Damsgaard and Lyytinen, 2001; Kurnia 
and Dare, 2005). The novel and interesting aspect that our paper brings to the fore is the question what role 
IT plays in this possible collapsing of the two levels traditionally viewed and analyzed as separate 
phenomena. 
We do not intend to give a definite answer in this paper but would like to take the opportunity to hint at a 
promising and tantalizing hypothesis. Beyond the obvious enabling aspect of technology – such as IT’s role 
in enabling virtual clusters – there seems to be hidden a deeper role. If technology’s role was limited to just 
enabling easier (tele-)communication and faster information processing, why does it not just make extant 
forms of economic organization, such as markets and hierarchies, more efficient or lead to shifts between 
extant forms as a result of differentially increasing relative efficiencies of extant forms, as Malone et al. 
(1987) have famously argued? Early on, Ciborra (1996) has speculated that, instead, new forms may arise 
which he saw and described as combinations of team-based organizational forms and markets and which 
we here may describe as various forms of our extended classification scheme. More broadly, why is it that 
‘platforms’ possibly collapse the two levels of economic activity as we have speculated above? We suspect 
that the answer lies in the essence of technology as something that turns everything into a resource and 
then relates resources in an instrumental, i.e. means-ends fashion to one another (Heidegger, 1977). Thus, 
the phenomena which traditionally are described as collective action are now being ‘economized’ in the 
sense that platform operators view market participants as resources that can be combined, and re-
combined, in ever more efficient ways. In essence, phenomena which used to be analyzed as instances of 
collective action aimed at creating ‘collective goods’ are being turned into instances of entrepreneurial 
action aiming at creating ‘private goods’ through efficient resource combination. Thus, technology might 
be not just an enabling factor but a driving force in this processes of continued economizing of organizing 
                                                             
9 Use of the term ‘collective action’ in this tradition should not be equated with Commons’ use of the term; 
for Commons, the term denotes all types of organized behavior whereas its modern use refers to forms of 
organized activity that aims at the production of collective or public goods as distinguished from private 
goods (Ostrom, 1990). 
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economic activities at ever higher levels. However, we must leave this idea for exploration in future 
research, well aware of the risk of being accused of resurrecting technological determinism. 
Relationships between the Four Emergent Forms 
A second noteworthy implication of our analysis is that the two forms in the right-hand column of Figure 
3, virtual clusters and industry-wide information infrastructures, seem to offer institutional alternatives to 
the forms in the left-hand column, online trading and service-delivery platforms, at least to some extent. 
Specifically, services organized through an online service delivery platform may alternatively also be 
organized through an industry-wide information infrastructure. A case in point concerns networks of 
healthcare providers, such as physicians, pharmacists, and home care providers, who jointly ‘compose’ and 
adjust a medication therapy. Similarly, transactions on an online trading platform, which are managed by 
a central oversight body, may also be conducted within a virtual cluster according to norms that emerge in 
that cluster without central direction and oversight. Yet, there are significant differences between these two 
pairs of forms of organizing economic activity that need to be considered. Regarding service-delivery 
platforms and industry-wide information infrastructures, the latter tend to comprise firms whereas the 
former tend to comprise individuals as their constituent members. Regarding virtual clusters and online 
trading platforms, the former comprise highly specialized small production firms in a production network 
whereas the latter mostly comprise homogenous groups of buyers and sellers on consumer markets. Yet, in 
view of our discussion above where we suggested that online trading and service delivery platforms may 
eventually evolve into higher-order forms of economic organization knitting together various simpler forms 
of organization into a complex structure, it is possible that these differences turn out to be non-substantial 
so that we may be moving towards a future where there are open, or non-managed forms of organizing 
economic activity (virtual clusters and industry-wide information infrastructures) competing with managed 
forms (online trading and service delivery platforms). 
Presently the IS field is enamored with success stories regarding entrepreneurs who successfully established 
online trading and service-delivery platforms. However, a much more interesting and socially relevant 
question might be how to develop virtual clusters and industry-wide information infrastructures. Above, 
we have argued that the phenomenon of two-sided networks may indicate a shift to higher-order forms of 
economic organization where network members become resources that can and need to be efficiently 
combined into useful services. However, industry-wide information infrastructures and virtual clusters do 
not aim at turning such economizing into private goods, albeit still aiming at efficient resource combination 
at the network level. Thus, to the extent that industry-wide information infrastructures and virtual clusters 
are institutional alternatives to online service delivery and trading platforms, they may be the socially more 
desirable forms. They may also be more difficult to develop since they cannot rely on profit as a motivational 
force at the network level. But they may also be the forms that are more interesting to study as they might 
turn out to be the ones that truly herald novel forms of organizing economic activities. The IS field has a 
long and strong track record of studying industry-wide information systems, albeit mostly at the level of 
inter-organizational networks rather than whole industries. Yet, since some time an interesting literature 
is shaping up around the concept of information infrastructures as infrastructuring that view information 
infrastructures not as socio-technical entities but as processes (Star and Ruhleder, 1996; Pipek and Wulf, 
2009; Aanestad et al., 2014). This novel perspective seems to be well suited to the study of these 
phenomena. 
Relationships between the Various Types of Transactions 
Finally, on a more general level, our analysis so far has implied that new forms of organizing economic 
activities are limited to comprising only two types of transactions. Is it possible that these also comprise 
three or even all four types of transactions? In the 1990s, a lively debate has emerged in the IS literature in 
the wake of Malone et al.’s ‘electronic market hypothesis’ (Malone et al., 1987; Wigand, 2011), including a 
proposal known as the ‘mixed mode hypothesis’ by Holland and Lockett (1993), which posits that IT affords 
the possibility to freely combine ‘coordination mechanisms’, a term which roughly correspond to the notion 
of transaction types, into organizational forms. It seems worthwhile to explore whether there are systematic 
reasons for limiting the number of types of transactions or coordination mechanisms that can be combined 
in an organizational form. Closer inspection of all eight forms classified above suggests that, indeed, there 
might be such a systematic reason. Specifically, each pair of transaction types associated with an 
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institutional form is characterized by a one-directional constitutive relationship such that one transaction 
type creates the possibility for the other to operate: 
 Hierarchy: rationing transactions (allocation of budgets) enable managerial transactions 
(combination of resources) 
 Hybrid: rationing transactions (by the dedicated governance body) enable mutual adjustment 
transactions (investments in partner-specific assets) 
 Cluster: Mutual adjustment transactions (specialization of all firms in view of the capabilities 
of the cluster as a whole) enable bargaining transactions (tapping into the pool of production 
capacities through short-term buying contracts) 
 Exchanges: Managerial transactions (e.g. regarding the running of a price publication and 
clearing system) enable bargaining transactions (e.g. two-sided auctions) 
 Online trading platforms: similar to exchanges 
 Online service delivery platforms: Rationing transactions (e.g. imposition of requirements on 
drivers, cars, and clients, setting of prices) enable managerial transactions (e.g. allocation of 
resources to produce transportation services) 
 Industry-wide information infrastructures: Rationing transactions (imposition of interfacing 
requirements) enable mutual adjustment transactions (e.g. alignment of production plans of 
supply chain members or of medication decisions of various healthcare providers) 
 Virtual clusters: similar to geographical clusters  
However, whether these relationships are coincidental or related to a deeper systematic reason needs to be 
explored in future research. This question may usefully be pushed forward by the IS field, even though it 
has implications in several related reference disciplines. The IS field has proven in the past that it is able to 
promote such a discussion and thus to also enrich its reference disciplines. 
Limitations 
Two limitations need to be mentioned. First, we have limited our analysis to cases that, in a broad sense, 
concern economic transactions. However, many interesting phenomena enabled by the Internet do not 
seem to be limited to or even concerned with economic transactions. To the extent that relevant emerging 
phenomena are not based on an economic logic they are indeed outside the scope of this analysis. Second, 
while we make use of the concept of ‘institutional forms’ (‘going concerns’ in Commons’ and ‘governance 
structures’ in Williamson’s terminology), our instantiations of various institutional forms are described 
through pairs of types of transactions. These make reference to how certain problems of coordination, in 
the presence of conflict and interdependence, are addressed but the concept of transaction cannot explain 
how institutional forms arise in the first place. As Ciborra (1996) has argued, Williamson’s analysis is 
incapable of describing how actors move from one institutional form to another since “transition costs” or, 
more broadly, organizational learning is not considered. The same limitation applies to our analysis. We 
suspect that this is related to the fact that the notion of transaction type does not consider Commons’ third 
principle, ‘futurity’, which refers to the expectation of continued and orderly exchange and cooperation. The 
IS field is replete with ‘visions’ that are often discarded as ‘hype’. However, this phenomenon seems to have 
a bearing on the ‘principle of futurity’ and, as such, be related to the question of how institutions emerge 
and, indeed, what makes an institution an institution. This question is also left unanswered by our analysis. 
Conclusions 
The concept of two-sided networks has, so far, primarily been used to derive prescriptive statements 
addressed at intermediaries who bring together the various user groups that constitute the phenomenon of 
two-sided networks. No effort has been made to study the phenomenon from an institutional perspective. 
In this paper, we have made a first step in this direction by extending the analytical apparatus developed by 
John R. Commons to describe and classify two-sided networks. As an intermediate step, we have also shown 
how the institutional forms of organizing economic activities proposed by Oliver Williamson, who himself 
drew on the works of Commons, can be mapped onto our classification scheme. In doing so, we have related 
a broad range of institutional forms to one another in a systematical manner which opens up interesting 
directions for research in two ways. On the one hand, our framework suggests that certain institutional 
forms can be considered as “discrete alternatives” (Williamson, 1996) which, so far, have not been related 
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to one other in this manner. On the other hand, our framework also suggests that the concept of two-sided 
networks foreshadows a new, higher-order form of organizing economic activities that may replace 
contemporary familiar forms such as hierarchical firms and long-term relationships between firms 
(hybrids). We will briefly highlight interesting and relevant questions that are suggested by these possible 
directions for future research. 
The literature on two-sided markets has treated specific instances of two-sided markets as possible 
applications of a general optimization logic. However, it has not yet studied whether these instances are 
related to one another in a systematic fashion. Our discussion suggests that, indeed, such systematic 
relations may exist. Specifically, virtual clusters and industry-wide information infrastructures can be seen, 
within certain limits, as institutional alternatives to online trading and service delivery platforms 
respectively. The differences in both cases consist of using a non-managed type of transaction that we 
termed a ‘mutual adjustment transaction’ instead of a managed type. Specifically, online service delivery 
platforms use managerial transactions whereas industry-wide information infrastructures use mutual 
adjustment transactions to combine resources efficiently; likewise, online trading platforms use managerial 
transactions and virtual clusters mutual adjustment transactions to create the conditions of possibility for 
conducting bargaining transactions. It is worthwhile to study under which conditions these institutional 
forms are, indeed, functional substitutes. Moreover, from a normative perspective, it also seems desirable 
to explore how the non-managed forms can be strengthened vis-à-vis their managed siblings that, so far, 
capture most of the attention and imagination of the IS community. In short, our paper points to a 
phenomenon that has been neglected and that is both interesting and worthwhile to explore in more depth. 
More generally, our paper suggests that two-sided networks are not just a new form of organizing economic 
activities that is now available to entrepreneurs in addition to established forms but that two-sided 
networks may indicate an imminent substitution of contemporary forms through new, higher-order forms 
of organizing economic activities. In fact, as observed above, Rochet and Tirole (2006) have suggested that 
the concept of two-sided networks can be used also to analyze economic relationships within traditional 
hierarchical firms, suggesting that the concept is broadly applicable. We suspect that the possibility of such 
application is rooted in an expanded perspective that the concept affords such that, with hindsight, it seems 
that hierarchical firms organize economic activities in a manner similar to a specific type of two-sided 
network which we call online service delivery platforms. Moreover, our analysis suggests that for each of 
the four ‘traditional’ forms identified by our framework there is a variant of a two-sided network that may 
eventually replace it, or evolve from it. These new forms cannot be reduced to traditional forms because 
they significantly expand the reach of purposefully organized economic activities; they are thus higher-
order forms of organizing economic activities (i.e. of “going concerns” in Commons’ terminology). It seems 
worthwhile and urgent to explore this possibility from a number of disciplinary perspectives, including 
competition theory and law, industrial relations, organizational and management studies, and information 
systems. Regarding the latter, it is especially interesting to explore the extent to which these new forms are 
enabled by information technology and thus the extent by which IT can be seen as facilitating, if not 
determining, changes in organizational structures. The lively debate on how IT might affect the organization 
of economic activities that was characteristic of the IS literature in the 1990s may fruitfully be referred to 
and broadened, promising to contribute to the reference disciplines such as economics and organization 
studies. Since some time, the field of information infrastructure studies has become increasingly attractive 
to a number of IS scholars as this concept allows for transcending the boundaries of small-scale projects 
and narrow IT effects that calls for rigorous research have imposed on IS researchers. Phenomena such as 
virtual clusters or industry-wide information infrastructures, shown to be potentially important by our 
paper, call for a resolute broadening of traditional IS concerns in order to be able to continue to make 
relevant contributions to organizational practice and theory. 
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